

THE *Dan Smoot Report*

Vol. 16, No. 49 (Broadcast 798) December 7, 1970 Dallas, Texas



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UN PIPELINE TO THE ENEMY?

Since the beginning of the Vietnam war, we have known that communists subject our captured men to the same kind of savage treatment inflicted on U.S. prisoners of war in Korea. Americans have been tortured, starved, and murdered. They have been caged like animals, and paraded before jeering mobs through enemy towns and villages.

U.S. officials estimate that 3000 Americans are prisoners in North Vietnam. They are kept in compounds near heavy population centers, as hostages to discourage U.S. air raids.⁽¹⁾

Early this year, U.S. military officials asked for permission to rescue Americans who were dying from maltreatment in a POW camp at Son Tay, about 20 miles west of Hanoi. Selection and training of volunteers for the rescue mission began in August, when Defense Secretary Melvin Laird gave his approval. On November 21, the mission was executed. U.S. Navy planes dropped flares along the coast east of Hanoi, jammed communist radar installations, and bombed a military installation near the city. While these diversionary activities were in progress, ten big U.S. helicopters, bearing about 50 volunteers, took off from a base in Thailand. The rescue team landed in the Son Tay camp, overwhelmed the guards (killing about 25 of them), broke open prisoner lockers, and thoroughly searched the compound — but found that all American prisoners had been moved.⁽²⁾

Communists fired more than thirty Soviet-built SAMS (surface to air anti-aircraft missiles) at the raiders; but the U.S. rescue team returned safely to base without suffering a serious casualty. One U.S. soldier was slightly wounded by a bullet from a Russian AK-47 rifle.⁽³⁾

Fired at low level, the communist SAMS did, however, cause considerable damage to structures and installations on the ground in the Hanoi suburbs. Western newspaper correspondents in Hanoi immediately filed stories for worldwide distribution, reporting the sounds of the recklessly-fired communist SAMS as the exploding of American bombs⁽³⁾ on innocent civilians in a residential neighborhood,

THE DAN SMOOT REPORT is published weekly by The Dan Smoot Report, Inc., Box 9538, Dallas, Texas 75214 (office at 6441 Gaston Ave.). Subscriptions: \$22.00 for 2 years; \$12.00, 1 year; \$7.00, 6 months. Dan Smoot was born in Missouri, reared in Texas. With BA and MA degrees from SMU (1938 and 1940), he joined the Harvard faculty (1941) as a Teaching Fellow, doing graduate work in American civilization. From 1942 to 1951, he was an FBI agent; from 1951 to 1955, a commentator on national radio and television. In 1955, he started his present independent, free-enterprise business: publishing this REPORT and abbreviating it each week for radio and TV broadcasts available for commercial sponsorship by business firms.

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pointing to the damage, which the communists themselves had done, as the work of callous Americans bent on slaughter.

All of that was to be expected. It was also to be expected that radical liberals in the U.S. Congress would side with the communists. When learning of the U.S. raid on Son Tay, U.S. Senator Claiborne Pell (Rhode Island Democrat) expressed no regret that the mission had failed to free American prisoners. Reacting with horror that force had been used in an effort to save American soldiers who were dying in a communist prison camp, Senator Pell could only exclaim "My God!"⁽³⁾ Senator J. William Fulbright (Arkansas Democrat) was also incensed by the effort to rescue American prisoners. Outwardly calmer than Senator Pell, but of the same mind and same loyalty, Fulbright said the rescue attempt "has the implications of a much wider war."⁽³⁾

On the other hand, all Americans with any decent concern for their own country and the lives of its soldiers found in the news of the rescue attempt something to lift the spirits, even though there was sorrowful disappointment that no rescue was accomplished.

For years, we have been angered by the spectacle of American soldiers committed to fight and die in a war they are not permitted to win.

We were outraged that President Johnson prohibited the bombing of strategic targets in North Vietnam — bombing which would have ended the military conflict in a few weeks, thus saving not only the lives of Americans and South Vietnamese but of North Vietnamese as well.

We were appalled that President Johnson, while prohibiting bombing that would have defeated the communist dictatorship, ordered massive raids, with multi-million-dollar aircraft, on empty jungles, pig trails, bicycle paths, and foot bridges. Such bombing (which cost us considerably more in property destroyed and wasted and in precious lives lost, than it ever cost the enemy) nourished worldwide communist propaganda

slandering Americans as a people and the U.S. as a military power.

We have listened with anguish as President Nixon talks about Vietnamization and phased withdrawal as a substitute for victory in Vietnam. There is no substitute for victory. Without a U.S. military victory in Vietnam, there is absolutely no hope of getting American prisoners released. Our experience in Korea proved that we cannot negotiate our soldiers out of communist prison camps. Unless we use overwhelming military force to rescue them, more than 90 percent of them are doomed, just as American prisoners were doomed when President Eisenhower stopped the Korean war on communist terms.

Although highest American officials have all along been aware of the barbaric treatment of American prisoners of war in Vietnam, the Son Tay raid was the first effort ever made to rescue any of them. That is a shameful commentary on Presidents Johnson and Nixon.

Nonetheless, it was good to know that President Nixon personally approved this one rescue mission. It was admirable of him to bring the leaders of the raid to the White House for special commendation, despite the loud lamentations of red doves in Congress and elsewhere.

On this lone, isolated event we cannot pin much hope that the President will go on now to do what he should do — what he should have done when he first took office: use enough military power to overthrow the communist dictatorship in North Vietnam and get *all* of our men out of *all* the prison camps throughout the land.

But miraculous things can be accomplished, if enough people work with dedication toward a common goal. Richard Nixon is a political weather vane, veering with changing currents of public opinion, yielding to prevailing pressures.

If enough Americans sent the President telegrams and letters praising him for the rescue-raid on the communist POW camp, and pleading with him to use all necessary force for military victory,

as the only possible way to free all of our men — it could have a profoundly beneficial effect.

The U.S. rescue raid on November 20 was an act of patriotism and heroism, something our demoralized country badly needed, a peg to hang a hope on. Yet, there was in it, I fear, something else.

Why had U.S. prisoners been removed from the camp? Defense Secretary Laird says that U.S. intelligence was excellent; military officials say there was no leak. Both of these claims cannot be completely accurate. If U.S. intelligence was excellent, then the American prisoners should have been in the camp, as reported. Then what are we to believe?

I believe there was a leak, of the kind that often occurred during the Korean war, not in the field but in Washington and in UN headquarters at New York.

The Korean war was formally designated a "United Nations police action," although Americans and South Koreans did practically all the fighting and dying on the anti-communist side.

The UN Charter provides that UN military action can be ordered only by the UN Security Council; and it stipulates that the Security Council's military affairs shall be conducted by the Military Staff Committee, consisting of one representative from each of the "Big Five" powers — nations which have permanent seats on the Council: U.S., U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, and free China. The UN civilian officer who has general supervision over the Military Staff Committee is the Under Secretary of Political and Security Council Affairs. Former UN Secretary General Trygve Lie said this office is the most important Assistant Secretaryship in the United Nations. It has always been held by a communist, and always will be, because of a special agreement among the "Big Five" powers.⁽⁴⁾

All this being so, and the Korean war having been formally proclaimed a UN military opera-

tion, there is still a widespread but mistaken belief in the United States that our forces fighting communists in Korea were under the supreme command of a communist who supervises the UN Security Council's Military Staff Committee.

Actually, however, the "UN police action" in Korea was illegal by the terms of the UN charter. With their veto, the Soviets prevented the UN Security Council from ordering military action in Korea. Under American leadership, the UN General Assembly illegally decided that *it* can order military action when the Security Council fails to do so. By-passing the Security Council, the UN General Assembly ordered military intervention in Korea and designated an American General (initially, Douglas MacArthur) commander; but General MacArthur and his successors commanded on orders from Washington.

Nonetheless, there was much treachery against our fighting forces in Korea. Although American commanders in Korea were not responsible to a communist-controlled UN committee, their plans and orders were generally known throughout the UN, because our State Department kept other UN members advised, trying to give an appearance of fact to the fiction that the Korean war was a United Nations effort.⁽⁵⁾

There were many occasions during that war when it was obvious that the communist enemy was being informed of American military activities. A most significant incident was related by General Mark Clark, American commanding general at the time of the Korean armistice. Testifying before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on August 10, 1954, General Clark said:

"One day I got a report, a flash one, very much concerned, that there was a tremendous buildup of enemy planes there on the north bank of the [Yalu] river. Of course, what I should have done was to smack them. That was my chance to catch their eggs in one basket, but I did not have the authority. All I did was to report facts back to . . . Washington. Those things [planes] did disappear. Very shortly

after that, those planes took off and went someplace else.”⁽⁶⁾

Obviously, communists in Asia had a pipeline through the United Nations into the Pentagon. The communist contact in the Pentagon apparently thought there was a possibility that General Clark might be authorized to destroy the concentration of planes across the Yalu. Warned of this danger through UN channels, the reds in China scrambled their planes to safety.

That is my speculative explanation of the intriguing event related by General Clark. I have a similar explanation for the removal of U.S. prisoners from the Son Tay POW camp just before our men raided it.

The war in Vietnam is not being fought as a UN affair. In fact, most UN members are harshly critical of us for fighting in Vietnam. Many of them are helping our communist enemy.

Yet, Presidents Johnson and Nixon, trying to justify U.S. action “in the eyes of the world,” have said that our responsibility in Vietnam arises from the SEATO treaty, which, they say, was made in compliance with and under the authority of the United Nations Charter.

As Truman tried to make fact of the fiction that the Korean war was a United Nations effort, so Johnson and Nixon (to a lesser degree) have tried in Vietnam. Because of this, I believe there are official channels of communication which keep the UN generally advised of what we are doing in Vietnam, and that traitors use these channels for relaying vital information to our enemy.

The fact that this situation existed during the Korean war, and the mere possibility that it exists now, would be reason enough for us to get out of the UN and get the UN out of the U.S. — if we had no other reasons.

There are many other compelling reasons for such action. Some of them will be discussed in a subsequent *Report*.

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FOOTNOTES

- (1) AP, Nov. 25, 1970
- (2) Times-Post News Service, Nov. 26, 27, 1970; New York Times News Service, Nov. 27, 1970
- (3) UPI, Nov. 24, 1970; AP, Nov. 25, 1970
- (4) *In The Cause Of Peace*, by Trygve Lie, Macmillan Company, 1954, pp. 45-6; Letter from State Department, signed by Assistant Secretary Frederick G. Dutton, October 2, 1962
- (5) *The Korean War and Related Matters*, Report of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Jan. 21, 1955
- (6) *Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments* (Part 21), Report of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Aug. 10, 1954, p. 1698

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